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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdicti>;." <. ;- ^ mneal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
PLAINTIFF APPELLANT CLAIMS 'I'll A I Fil lTIN \ l COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF APPELLANT HAD 
FAIIM' »" MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING A SUBSTANTIAL 
MATERIAL CHANGE Ol ( IKfl I "MS 'I ,\N( V MM 1 WAS NOT 
FORESEEABLE AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE. 
Standard of Review 
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial cow • ->f discretion. "The 
determination of the trial court that there has or has not been a substantial change of circumstances 
. . . is presumed v a I • 11 '' Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998) (citing Wells v. Wells. 871 
P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994)). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Ulal. Cw.L A,,.. § 3D-T -c> (7)(g)(i) (effectiveMay 1, 1995). 
"The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantia i. liungo and new orders regarding 
;iI iniony based upon a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time o 
divorce." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
This is a case that was heard by the trial court on the Plaintiff Appellant's Petition to Modify 
the Divorce Decree to terminate his alimony obligation to the Defendant Appellee. The Plaintiff 
Appellant filed his petition on October 9, 1995. This appeal is from the trial court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order denying the Plaintiff Appellant's Petition to Modify entered 
on August 10, 1998, following a bench trial on June 18, 1998. 
B. Course of Proceeding 
The Defendant Appellee agrees with the Plaintiff Appellant's statement of the course of the 
proceeding. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court entered an order: 
1. That the Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce be and the same is hereby denied, and 
2. That counsel for the Defendant/Appellee be and he is hereby granted leave to file an 
application for attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein by way of affidavit for 
further consideration by the Court and the Plaintiff/Appellant, by and through his 
counsel, be and he is hereby granted leave to file such opposition thereto as he shall 
deem necessary, following which the matter may be submitted to the Court 
determination. 
(Appellant's Addendum 5). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant Appellee agrees with the Plaintiff Appellant's statement of the facts with the 
following additions, corrections, and modifications. 
1. The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered on or about 
November 4, 1983. 
2. The trial court in the original divorce action found that if the Defendant Appellee, 
hereinafter "Ms. Petersen", became certificated as a teacher then her "ability to produce income 
would approximate one fourth (1/4) to one fifth (1/5) that of the Plaintiff in the event she could 
secure a teaching contract which is speculative at best." (Appellee's Addendum 1, f 5, p. 4). 
3. The trial court in the original divorce action found that "for a period of approximately 
17 years, the defendant has not been employed outside of the parties' home but is in all probability 
now required to seek employment and additional education and training to assist in providing partial 
support for herself and the parties' minor children." (Appellee's Addendum 1, If 11, p.6). 
4. The Plaintiff Appellant, hereinafter "Dr. Petersen", had gross income in 1997 of 
approximately $735,000. (Appellant's Addendum 6, Tf 6, p.2). 
5. Ms. Petersen's 1997 income, exclusive of alimony, was approximately $40,400. 
(Appellant's Addendum 6, Tf 8, p.3). 
6. Ms. Petersen's 1997 income was approximately one eighteenth (1/18) of Dr. 
Petersen's 1997 income. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IN THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE ACTION 
FOUND THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY MS. PETERSEN WOULD BE 
REQUIRED TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT, THEREFORE, HER SUBSEQUENT 
EMPLOYMENT WAS FORESEEABLE. 
The applicable statute requires as a threshold matter that there be a substantial material 
change in circumstance that was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce to support a petition to 
modify an existing divorce decree. Ms. Petersen's employment was not only a foreseeable event it 
was anticipated that her employment would be required and the trial court specifically so found. The 
trial court also found that there would be a significant disparity in the incomes of the parties, which 
indeed occurred. Therefore, Dr. Petersen has not met his threshold burden as required by law. 
II. DR. PETERSEN FAILED TO SHOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN A 
SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING 
A MODIFICATION OF THE ALIMONY AWARD 
The party seeking to modify an alimony award bears the burden of proving that there has 
been a change of circumstance which justifies the modification. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 
156, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Dr. Petersen failed to meet that burden. Assuming arguendo that 
Ms. Petersen's employment at her income level was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce, her 
subsequent employment would not justify the reduction or elimination of alimony. The trial court 
found that Ms. Petersen lives in the same residence; has the same basic expenses; and has 
continuously pursued employment to help her meet her expenses and provide for her support. 
(Addendum 6 to Appellant's Brief, f 12, p.4-5). In addition, the child support of $1800 per month 
she was receiving has terminated with the emancipation of all the parties' minor children. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IN THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE ACTION 
FOUND THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY MS. PETERSEN WOULD BE 
REQUIRED TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT, THEREFORE, HERSUBSEQUENT 
EMPLOYMENT WAS CLEARLY FORESEEABLE. 
Dr. Petersen filed his Petition to Modify on October 9, 1995 requesting that his alimony 
obligation to Ms. Petersen, be terminated. (Record 15-18). U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) which governs 
modification of alimony awards became effective on May 1,1995. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals 
determined that the 1995 amendments to U.C.A. §30-3-5 were substantive legal changes and 
therefore only governed petitions to modify which were filed after the enactment date of May 1, 
1995. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that where an original petition to 
modify was filed prior to the effective date and amended after the effective date the new statute did 
not apply.) Accordingly, the court correctly applied the standard codified in U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) 
to Dr. Petersen's petition to modify. 
U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) requires a threshold showing that the alleged substantial material 
change of circumstance be something that was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Moon v. 
Moon, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah App. 1999). Under this standard, Dr. Petersen must show that 
the alleged change in circumstance be something that was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
Dr. Petersen simply cannot meet this burden because Ms. Petersen's future employment was 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. The trial court in the original divorce action found that Ms. 
Petersen would "in all probability" need to seek employment to assist in supporting herself and her 
children. (Appellee's Addendum 1, ^ 11, p.6). The trial court explicitly anticipated and found that 
Ms. Petersen would need to become employed to assist in the support of herself and her children. 
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The trial court also found that Ms. Petersen's ability to produce income would be 
approximately one fourth (1/4) to one fifth (1/5) that of Dr. Petersen in the event she could secure 
a teaching contract which is speculative. (Appellee's Addendum 1, f 5, p.4). The trial court correctly 
anticipated that Ms. Petersen's ability to produce income would be a fraction of Dr. Petersen's 
income producing ability. The actual disparity was grossly underestimated, Ms. Petersen's income 
turned out to be closer to one eighteenth (1/18) of Dr. Petersen's income. 
The amendment became effective on May 1, 1995 and governs Dr. Petersen's petition to 
modify which was filed on October 9, 1995. The case on which Dr. Petersen substantially relies, 
Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990) was decided prior to the enactment 
of the 1995 amendment and is therefore inapplicable to this case. Dr. Petersen simply cannot show 
that Ms. Petersen's employment, at her current income level, was not a foreseeable event at the time 
of the divorce. The trial court explicitly found that Ms. Petersen would probably need to secure 
gainful employment and that her income would probably be one fourth (1/4) to one fifth (1/5) that 
of Dr. Petersen. Her employment as a school teacher or at a similar income level in another 
occupation was not only foreseeable it was anticipated by the trial court as being "in all probability" 
required. (Appellee's Addendum 1, f 11, p.6). The trial court properly identified the fact that the 
original findings anticipated Ms. Petersen's employment. (Addendum 6 to Appellant's Brief, K 10, 
p.4). The only factor that was arguably not foreseeable was the huge disparity between the parties' 
incomes. 
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II. DR. PETERSEN FAILED TO SHOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN A 
SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE 
JUSTIFYING A MODIFICATION OF THE ALIMONY AWARD. 
Even assuming arguendo that Ms. Petersen's employment was not foreseeable, her 
employment is not a substantial material change that justifies a reduction of alimony. Once a court 
addresses the foreseeability question, that court may find that a party's employment is a substantial 
material change of circumstance if such employment creates a change in financial condition that is 
comparatively significant. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that "'A relative change in the 
income and expenses of the parties, if comparatively significant, can amount to a substantial change 
in circumstances' justifying a modification of a prior alimony award." Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Jeppson v. Jeppson. 684 P.2d 69, 70 
(Utah 1984). The question then becomes whether Ms. Petersen's employment has created a relative 
change in income and expenses that is comparatively significant. The trial court found that Ms. 
Petersen's employment did not amount to such a substantial change because of a number of 
balancing financial factors. 
The trial court's findings state: 
That the circumstances have not materially or substantially changed since the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce herein, i.e., she resides in the same residence that was the parties' marital residence at the 
date of divorce; her basic expenses have not substantially or materially changed; she has accepted 
and continuously pursued her employment in order to meet her monthly expenses and provide for 
her support and maintenance and that she has not received and retained substantial funds by way of 
gift or inheritance which have altered or affected her circumstances significantly. (Addendum 6 to 
Appellant's Brief, K 12, p.4-5). 
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The trial court also found that Ms. Petersen no longer receives any child support because of 
the emancipation of the parties' youngest child. (Addendum 6 to Appellant's Brief, Tf 4, p.2). 
The Appellant's brief states that Ms. Petersen currently makes "between 46 and 47 percent 
of the total income earned by Dr. Petersen" in 1983 (the time of divorce). (Appellant's Brief, p. 12) 
The Appellant ignores, however, the economic reality which is that 1983 dollars are not the same 
as 1999 dollars. The cost of living has increased greatly in the 16 years and will in all probability 
continue to increase. The Appellant's failure to acknowledge this fact underscores the error of the 
Appellant's position. The trial court properly found that Ms. Petersen's employment has not created 
a substantial material change in circumstance. The trial court found that Ms. Petersen's monthly 
expenses were $4700. (Addendum 6 to Appellant's Brief, If 11, p.4). The trial court further found 
that Ms. Petersen required both her employment income and her alimony income to maintain those 
monthly expenses. The trial court, which has the facts before it, is in the best position to make a 
factual determination as to whether there has been a substantial material change of circumstances. 
Once that decision has been made it should not be upset or overturned absent clear error. No such 
error can be found in this case. Here, the trial court properly and realistically considered the 
financial circumstances of Ms. Petersen and declined Dr. Petersen's request to terminate alimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The determination of the trial court must be upheld on two independent grounds. First, Dr. 
Petersen failed to meet the statutory requirement that Ms. Petersen's employment was not 
foreseeable at the time of divorce. Dr. Petersen alleged as the sole ground for his appeal that Ms. 
Petersen's employment constituted a substantial material change of circumstance that was not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Yet the trial court in the original divorce action explicitly 
found that it was probable that Ms. Petersen would need to become employed to assist in the support 
8 
of herself and her children. Accordingly, the trial court properly recognized that existing law 
requires the denial of Dr. Petersen's petition to modify. 
Second, assuming arguendo that Ms. Petersen's employment was not foreseeable, Dr. 
Petersen failed to meet his burden of showing that there has been a substantial material change. The 
trial court weighed the evidence presented by the parties and determined that Ms. Petersen's 
circumstances had not changed such as to justify a termination in alimony.1 
Statement of Relief Sought 
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellee respectfully requests the following relief: 
1. That the trial court's ruling be affirmed; and 
2. That this court award Appellee attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of 
this appeal. 
DATED: July 7,1999. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWEWSON 
,ARK W. SESSIONS 
OTHEW A(STEWARD 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
1
 At trial, Dr. Petersen claimed that the divorce decree should be modified by reason of a 
"substantial inheritance" received by Ms. Petersen. That claim was properly rejected by the trial 
court and has apparently been abandoned by Dr. Petersen in his appeal. 
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Tabl 
d a r k W. Sessions,. E:;q, 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
300 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
000O000--
GAS' PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JULIE A. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF jfACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for 
r n - be "•. •"'• Honorable Calvin Gould, one of the judges of the 
above-entitled court ii I In1 " • Liy nl II i I n l j e i Ill"111 I " 
continuing thereafter on October 1983. The plaintiff Gary 
P.:- --* - person and represented by Pete N. Vlahos 
of Vlahos , P erkm. bnarp , riainti f f " s att : i: neys Til: : .e defendant 
Julie A. Peterson was present i n person and represented by Clark 
"I Il1 ! 11' s, s, i in11 *, 11 I! Sessic•" Moore, Defendant' s attorneys . The 
parties were duly sworn and examinee .n support ul ilLli I .I.ILII|I 1 .i i in 
and Counterclaim ii- r^i , heard and received 
-. • - • ^ a d 
documentary evidence and aftei taking the matter un iex 
advisement, issued its Memorandum «r ^v of 
0 'fnhri . 1983 and being fully advised in the premise . , »w 
make, adopt , fallowing: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and the Defendant are now and for a 
period :; excess of three / monci filing 
Compl Counterclaim herein are and were actuax 
bona fide resident bounty, State of Utah. 
2. Thaf Plaintiff and Defendant sband and wife 
K.^: , married in Logan, Utah on or about i. ru. JU.UI H,,.)," 
of September, I^OJ. 
3. That the Plaintiff and the -.-. • * • -
^:ui- of their marriage, to-wit: 
Scott bon, . anuary Cami Lyn born April , 
Stephanie A:--, born December 4 -o November 
'van Mathew born Octobei 197.5; and Andrea Kay born 
November efendant should b< awarded the 
care, custody and control of said mine ;• ubj ect to 
f 1:J,I n t:if f * s ri;r:h^  to visit said children at all reasonable times 
and places p r o vi ae c t: tia l: t: lie f i a :I n t i 11: g :1 v e the Defendant notice 
exercise of said visitation right exercise 
the Defendant in • \< exercise ot such visitation 
rights accommodate trie requeui . i in nor children for and in 
connection with the exercise ot such visitation rigi* ' » 
respec iiid activities dictate and as are i- M e 
best interests of said minor children. Further, the Plaintiff 
should exeici, ;.i ., I /isi ration rights every other weekend and 
during alternating holiday and vaca s. 
4. That for a period in excess of three (3) months prior 
to the Iilinii, . Hurai I herein, the Defendant has treated 
the Plaintiff cruelly and the Plaintxi Defendant 
cruelly causing each of the respective parties mental and 
emotional n i , u • and anguish in that* arguments and 
disagreements have ensued between the parLiti:,. "i "iffi M,.'spec,I, I 
their future together and the future of the minor children of the 
parties; iLil iiieaii J og ful "Minjiiin <.\*it" i - n between the parties has 
ceased; that the Plaintiff has moved rrom tne Lebidunu1 ot ill 
rh?* Plaintiff has been \ company of a female 
person otnei n lu»fund.mf n 1 without her consent and that 
while reconciliation has been attempted and disc, ut.i..t i , 
hfir, been, L O : avail, making continuation of the marriage under 
the circumstances reason of the mental 
and emotional condition and distress ^r cae Plainrjrt i In* 
Defendant and the parties' minor children and the period of time 
the above-em Bending, * . ,.* 
specifically finds that each parties shu 
T^ -*> of Divorce from the other and that the same should become 
final upow i • - . waiting periods 
IiI connection therewith, including the interlocutory pe^ 
si: LOT iJ id t e: wad ^  i ed ,„ 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff H practicing 
physician ana LluL ml Ml inn il i hricheloi master's and 
doctor cz medicine degree, the Plaintifi u.*~ 
internal medicine and cardiology. The Court finds 
:;, addition that , calendar year 
1981 were in excess c Hundred Three Thousand DOIJL... 
($103,000.00 exceeded One Hundred Five Thousand Dollars 
($105,000. I 111.mint I 11 I slieh earnings 
probability will exceed Ninety-Five aousand 
f$95f000.00l a practicing physician, the Court finds 
that the Plaintift nroducing income 
before taxes I excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars. 
($100,000 (Ml) per annum and that while the Defendant ii college 
graduate with bachelc
 v school 
teacher, she Is not currently certificated and will require 
add i i i oil,! I Training to become certificatec addition, the 
Court finds that i ' ::ei:t J, 1, i t i e d , I'i't'l »n J! oroduce 
income would approximate one fourth (1/4) Cu one fifth that 
I II '" 1" I ai nt i t f in fl • event she could secure \ teaching 
contract which , speculaL " finds 
that the express intention . Defendant is pursue an 
field other than teaching. 
lines unai 
from college, the Defendant provided through her earnings, funds 
maintenance of the parties during 
the attainment , •:.. Plaintifl ;^j oieaical degree i 
for tuition, fees and expenses provided by the Plaintiff's father 
and nom raduate study :: trn form of 
stipend and summer vacatio: ..noai 
that the Defendant has been unemployed .-.;•„ of the parties1 
home .mil III. ml .1 mi. .1 h I 11 employment primarily at the insistence 
of the Plaintiff and by mutual agreement . ; ^ i* 
the raising and nurturing of the partie; children 
respons. Dartnership, while the Plaintiff 
practiced medicine and generated substantial earnings therefrom 
upon which the parties and their children enjoyed a standard 
llvi: , , contributed, 
7. The Court finds that the help anc «.« i ,st. MIL >"! ""niiHnrl 
)efendant was a substantial and material factor in the 
Plaii*;.i. . - !". iin hr.'iil degree • :- :e course of the 
parties' marriage and that the Plaintir: 
based upon that medical degree. r finds addition, 
that *,_. vcu.ut : •:* Plaintiff's 
medical degree ai . .^ i laintif f' parnm c 
thereon and s<*~^ r ^ v,^  .: * finds . , just •::». equitable 
I " imor. dnia a *i. u property 
award. 
:R
 v * - finds that prior t (he separation of the 
parties ana . • irei IU i mi i hr above-entitled action, they 
enjoyed trips rr vacations together and with their fain. 
ttiej acquired a number of investments hereinafter described; that 
they acquirec
 fci , I inp n-i i furniture, 
-5-
furnishing fixtures of significant value and otherwise 
enjoyed recreational pUrsUxts mil i I i Iv \\ y l» i uuuut'iKjin jiili y i i I 
their income and social standing. The Co .irt further finds that 
Plaintiff was able, following the separation of the parties, 
to take trips and pay expense 
female companion, while the Defendant was able to participate 
trip; ;M"' V.'T.'-I f* i ons only when they were financed by others. 
9, The Court finds that for a period • :;: f approximate 
seventeen years, the defendant has not been employed outside 
probability now required 
seek employment and additional education and trainxnc i 
assist in providing partial support for herself and the parties1 
h i1dran 
I 1.1.11 I lie Defendant should In. dwarded Lliu inn I I III!11 i i, 
Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month per child j •; olid tor child 
parties respective children reach 
the age of eightee, . --s or graduate tivn lu^h uchji 1, 
whichever event later occurs, 
] Il The run j i t finds that the Defendant should be awarded 
the sum < Thousand Dollar*. 
permanent alimony commence and be payable on November 
•'in11 I "' <:,onf i nlit U C L U U c a l e n d a r m o n t h 
thereafter until the earlier of her death or remarriage. 
12. The Court finds that Defendant should be awarded 
lump sum property settlement award payable equal monthly 
-6-
installments i I One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) each without 
interest, from iln.1 U.JI i ' f 11 li.'ivul , • ;! ~ :J. 
13. The Court finds that the Defenaan: 
awarded as her sole and separate property, without claim from the 
Plaintiff, the roperty and adjacent 
lot, subject existing first mortgage obixgai i, 
approximate sum of One Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Dollars 
($142,000 . nil in wtu n.ii  i in Hi I e rid .in ii ihmilrl In ordered to assume, 
pay, discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless frou 
f i ni I", r I* i  r f; 1 market value of said perty, approximates 
Three Hundred . 000.00). 
14. The Court finds that the Defendant should li. UWUILILJ U 
.- - separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff, 
_., garniture, furn is. liances an'; personal 
property located in ar . .*> residence, real property 
hereinabove described, provided, however, the Plaintiff should be 
awarded at> hi .i-i .MI oL^arui i* \ i njir • > , without claim from iv 
Defendant, the parties1 wooden secretary bookcase, video ._•... 
.*•::• svstem, yellow overstuffed * . and ottoman and 
parties v.j::e- tabic luciu ml ' family room at said 
residence. 
i Che Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded as 
her sole and separate
 k^c the Plaintiff, 
the parties" IHITT Surburban vehicle and* the parties 
.nil i'i.i -In I M . r r r n 1111,", nr,ed by the parties1 .children The 
Court finds in addition, that the i" 1 a I, i 1J I,.,\ I I „ i : 1 
1 
benefit of a 1983 -JBuick automobile through his professional 
corporation and that all expenses, including insurance, 
maintenance and operation charges are paid by such professional 
corporation. 
16. The Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded as 
her sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff, 
existing life insurance on the Plaintiffs life wherein the 
Defendant' is the owner of such policies. Such award shall 
include but shall not be limited to, the right to receive cash 
values therefrom, designate beneficiaries thereunder and all 
rights, duties and responsibilities appurtenant thereto. 
17. The Court finds that the parties should retain an equal 
ownership of the J&E Investments partnership in which the parties 
have a twenty-five percent (25Z) interest each, rather than 
making a distribution thereof which could result in income tax 
consequences not of their own making, choosing or design. 
18. The Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded 
any and all interest in and to any pension, profit sharing, 
retirement or similar plan or benefit, to which she may become 
entitled by reason of her future employment or otherwise, without 
claim from the Plaintiff. 
19. The Court finds that the existing b enefits credited to 
the account of the Plaintiff in the Gary V. Peterson, M.D., 
Professional Corporation pension and profit sharing plan, exceeds 
Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) and that the Defendant has a 
vested interest to the same to the extent of ninety percent (90Z) 
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thereof. The Court further finds that additional contributions 
have been made during the calendar year 1983 to the account of 
the Plaintiff and that in order to fairly distribute the assets 
of the parties, the Plaintiff should be awarded all such 
retirement plan benefits without claim from the Defendant, 
20. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded as 
his sole and separate property without claim from the Defendant, 
all right, title and interest in and to Gary V. Peterson, M.D., a 
professional corporation. The Court finds that the accounts 
receivable of such corporation exceed Forty Thousand Dollars 
($40,000.00) in addition to ether and related assets, including 
the Plaintiff's capital contribution thereto of approximately 
Four Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($4,100.00) and cash of 
approximately Two Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($2,600.00) as of 
July 6, 1983. 
21.. The Court finds that following the commencement of the 
above-entitled action, the Plaintiff executed and implemented a 
family trust known as the Gary V. Peterson Family Irrevocable 
Trust with the primary purpose of providing educational funds for 
the parties' minor children. The Court further finds that the 
Plaintiff transferred to such trust a certain X-ray machine, 
related equipment, supplies and accessories which has and will 
continue to generate income in excess of the payments thereon. 
The Court finds, in addition, that the Plaintiff should be 
awarded as his sole and separate property, without claim from the 
Defendant, any and all interest in and to such trust assets, 
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including the right to revoke such trust in the event the same is 
revocable, as the Plaintiff shall deem advisable. 
22. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded as 
his sole and separate property, without claim from the Defendant, 
the parties1 right, title and interest in and to the real 
property, improvements and furniture, fixtures, appliances and 
personal property located in and at the Yorkshire Condominium, 
Ogden, Utah, the parties1 condominium at 4956 Quail Lane, Ogden, 
Utah and the rental residence and real property located at 580 
28th Street, Ogden, Utah and the Plaintiff should be ordered to 
assume, pay and discharge any and all obligations existing in 
connection with said properties, improvements and personal 
property and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
23. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded as 
his sole and separate property, the parties1 boat, motor and 
trailer ^with a value of Four Thousand Two Hundred Dollars 
($4,200.00), the parties1 interest in and to the Biomass 
Partnership of nominal value, Peterson Land Development, a 
limited partnership of the value of Three Thousand .Six Hundred 
Dollars ($3,600.00) and the Knowlwood Condominium, Ogden, Utah, 
acquired by the Plaintiff following the separation of the parties 
together with all furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances 
located therein and thereat, with an approximate value of Three 
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($3,700.00) all without claim from 
the Defendant, provided however, the Plaintiff should be ordered 
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to assume, pay and discharge any and all obligations connected 
therewith and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom, 
24. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded 
the existing undivided one seventh (1/7) interest in and to the 
parties' Bear Lake property (the subject of the Plaintiff's 
parents1 trust) and further, that the Defendant should be ordered 
and directed to convey her existing undivided one seventh (1/7) 
interest therein to the parties' youngest minor child, Andrea 
Kay, as Beneficiary pursuant to the same terms, provisions and 
conditions as each of the other minor children own a one seventh 
(1/7) interest therein and thereto. The Court finds in addition 
that the parties1 interest therein approximates Five Thousand One 
Hundred Forty-Two Dollars ($5,142.00) and Two Thousand Six 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($2,650.00) representing the approximate 
value of the furniture, furnishings and fixtures located therein 
and thereat. 
25. The Court finds that each of the parties should be 
awarded their own personal effects, wearing apparel, jewelry and 
personal property currently in their possession without claim 
from the other. 
26. The Court finds that the parties should file Federal 
and State income tax returns for the calendar year 1983 on such 
bases as are in the best interest of the parties and each party 
should be ordered to pay that portion of any such tax assessment 
and obligation attributable to the parties on the same ratio that 
each such parties' income bears to the total income of the 
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parties and in the event of any refund, rebate or allowance, such 
should be divided between the parties on a like basis. 
27. The Court finds that due to the income tax consequences 
of this divorce to the parties, that it is fair, just and 
equitable that the Plaintiff be permitted to claim the six (6) 
minor children of the parties as deductions and exemptions for 
Federal and State income .tax purposes for the taxable year 1983 
and thereafter. 
28. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be ordered to 
assume, pay and discharge and hold the Defendant harmless from 
the following debts and obligations incurred during the course of 
the marriage of the parties: 
A. The existing second mortgage on the parties1 
residence and real property located at 6039 Breeze Circle, 
Ogden, Utah, in the approximate sum of Forty-Four Thousand 
Dollars ($44,000.00); 
B. The existing loan secured by a third mortgage on 
the parties1 residence and real property located at 6039 
Breeze Circle, Ogden, Utah, in favor of Gary V. Peterson, 
M.D., pension and profit sharing plan in the approximate sum 
of Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) and other loans, if 
any, made to the Plaintiff by said pension and profit 
sharing plan; 
C. An existing open account obligation to Texaco in 
the approximate sum of Three Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($350.00); 
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D. The September and October, 1983 first mortgage 
payments on the parties1 residence and real property at 6039 
Breeze Circle, Ogden, Utah, together with outstanding 
utility bills, obligations and accounts in connection 
therewith; 
E. Outstanding open account charges incurred by the 
parties for children1s clothing and accessories necessary 
for the children's enrollment in public schools for the 1983 
school year; and 
F. All personal expenses and obligations incurred for 
the benefit of the Plaintiff since the separation of the 
parties. 
29. That the Defendant should be ordered to assume, pay, 
discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless from, the following 
bills and obligations incurred during the course of the parties1 
marriage:. 
A. All open accounts, charge accounts and similar 
obligations not hereinabove specifically ordered to be paid 
by the Plaintiff; and 
E. All debts, obligations and charges incurred for 
the use and benefit of the Defendant since the separation of 
the parties, including loans from the Defendant's parents 
and other relatives. 
30. The Court finds that the stipulation of the parties 
arith respect to health, accident, medical and dental insurance on 
and for the benefit of the parties' six (6) minor children, is 
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fair, just and equitable and as such, the Plaintiff should be 
ordered to provide at his sole cost and expense, health, 
accident, medical and dental insurance on and for the benefit of 
the parties1 six (6) minor children, during his obligation of 
support thereof, provided however, the Plaintiff shall be allowed 
the right to schedule dental and "medical services for the 
parties1 minor children other than emergency services and the 
Defendant should be ordered to cooperate with the Plaintiff in 
every respect in obtaining, securing and scheduling such 
services. Each of the parties should be ordered to assume, pay 
and discharge any and all obligations for such medical and dental 
services not covered by such insurance on an equal basis. 
31. The Court finds that by reason of the substantially 
equal division of the assets of the parties acquired during the 
course of their marriage, that each of the parties should be 
ordered to assume, pay and discharge their own costs and expenses 
incurred in connection with the above-entitled action, including 
attorney's fees. 
32. The Court finds that each of the parties should be 
ordered to execute such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and 
other documents as may be necessary to transfer the property as 
awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 
Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court 
now eakes the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant are entitled to be 
awarded a Decree of Divorce each from the other, upon the grounds 
of mental cruelty and that such divorce shall become final upon 
its entry herein by the Clerk of the above-entitled court and 
that any and all applicable waiting periods, including the 
interlocutory period, shall be waived. 
2. That the Defendant is entitled to be awarded the care, 
custody and control of the six (6) minor children of the parties, 
to-wit: Erick Scott; Cami Lyn; Stephanie Ann; Tifani Jill; Ryan 
Mathew; and, Andrea Kay; subject to Plaintiff fs rights of 
reasonable visitation which should be awarded to the Plaintiff, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of the exercise 
thereof as hereinabove set forth in the Findings of Fact of the 
Court. 
3. ^ That the award of alimony, child support, property 
settlement and the division of the assets acquired and the 
liabilities incurred during the course of the marriage of the 
parties in accordance with the stipulation of the parties, read 
into the record herein and as set forth in the Findings of Fact 
of the Court, should be and are approved in all respects and 
adopted as Conclusions of Law as if fully set forth hereat. 
4. That each of the parties hereto should be responsible 
for and pay their own costs and expenses incurred in connection 
herewith, including attorney's fees. 
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5. That each pf the parties hereto should be ordered to 
execute such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and other 
documents as may be necessary to transfer the property as awarded 
by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 
6. That the Court should make and enter its Decree of 
Divorce accordingly. 
DATED this . W day of -kfeL, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
CALVIN GOULD 
Calvin Gould 
District Judge 
STATE OF UTAH X
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